I keep running into the same argument. Simplified, it seems to run as follows:
Aristotle: I claim that P is true.
Boethius: I do not believe that P is true.
Aristotle: You must accept that P is true because you say you follow Catullus.
Catullus says P is true.
Boethius: I certainly accept the authority of Catullus,
but I deny that Catullus says that P is true.
Aristotle: Then you cannot truly follow Catullus.
Boethius: But I do follow Catullus, but not in the way that you do.
Aristotle: There is no other way to follow Catullus, for Catullus says Q.
Boethius: I do not believe that Catullus says Q.
Relabel "Catullus says Q" with P and go to the third line.
I doubt if there are arguments that always follow this interminably nesting form, though it seems to me that some theological arguments do indeed have that quality.
If the argument were to continue, would it ever converge? I suspect that it would if these two followers of Catullus finally hit some atomic statement at the heart of their fellowship with Catullus, an axiom upon which they both agreed, then they would have to work backwards through cycles in order to work out who was right.
This is unlikely to happen in theological discussion, because theology does not seem to be atomic, or if it is, the atoms of faith are not as accessible to argument. I've thought below on the nature of the difference between axioms (assumptions) and dogmata. Assumptions form the starting points of a rational theory; dogmata are statements of belief about reality. Axioms are not open to enquiry, dogmata are.
Thus it is unlikely that Aristotle's argument with Boethius will ever have a conclusion unless the doctrine of Catullus is axiomatic. If it's dogmatic, then there is precious little hope of any resolution. If there is only One True Catullus, then this argument cannot ever really hope to determine what he truly says, though Aristotle and Boethius will both still claim to follow the One True Catullus.
So how is the whole situation to be rectified?
Catullus knows!
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4 comments:
"Catullus knows!"
Does he, now? Might it be that he himself is not internally self-consistent? That is true of most of us. Might it even be that he deliberately constructed a statement as to be patent of two different interpretations between which he was undecided? I've done that.
A and B, though both quoting C, have interpreted C differently. What have they achieved in this argument? Well, they have demonstrated that, on this point, the opinion of C is not sufficiently clear to make a case.
A in this case cannot prevail, as his case rests on evidence B does not believe to exist -- that is the case unless A can demonstrate that C did speak as alleged and that A's interpretation is indeed what C intended in his statement.
The solution to this problem? Begin again with a more sure authority. If the proposition is true, there is more than one way to demonstrate it. If it all hinges on one "proof" and one only, I find it necessary to reject it as doubtful at best.
ed
Catullus says P is true
Catullus says quite a lot of things, not all of which are entirely suitable for a pre-watershed audience...
Well, that's true. Orff's Catulli Carmina bears witness to that.
This has to be one of the most insightful commentaries on the Anglican response to the Pope's proposed Ordinariates I have read so far!
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